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ed. in conjunction with Naturalism, Normativity, and the Space of Reasons Conference at 
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ABSTRACT: In the contemporary metaethical debate, expressivist (Blackburn, Gibbard) 
and constructivist (Korsgaard, Street) views can be viewed as inspired by irrealist ideas 
from Hume and Kant respectively. One realist response to these contemporary irrealist 
views is to argue that they are inconsistent with obvious surface-level appearances of 
ordinary ethical thought and discourse, especially the fact that we talk and act as if there is 
ethical knowledge. In this paper, I explore some constructivist and expressivist options for 
responding to this objection. My conclusion is that, although both constructivists and 
expressivists can capture other surface-level features of ethical thought and discourse, the 
possibility of ethical knowledge causes special problems for these versions of irrealism. I 
end with some comments about where I think irrealists should begin to look for a response 
to these special problems, which points, somewhat surprisingly, towards an alternative 
inferentialist form of irrealism about epistemic and ethical thought and discourse, which is 
inspired by Sellars. 
 
Introduction 
One of the original motivations for irrealism in metaethics was skepticism about ethical 
properties. The argument is roughly as follows: According to a dominant empiricism 
tracing back at least to Hume and Kant, discovering the matter-of-factual properties of 
things involves those properties bearing some explanatory connection to possible objects 
of experience. Yet, if ethical properties existed, they wouldn’t be like that. They wouldn’t 
be like that because ethical values appear to bear some special ‘internal’ connection to 
action. And no empirically discoverable property could do that. 
Each step of this argument is controvertible. However, assuming that we accept the 
argument, this skepticism about the putative ethical properties of things can seem to force 
us very quickly to endorse a radical error theory or a pernicious relativism in our 
metaethics. Irrealist views, such as expresivism and constructivism, offer a way to avoid 
this empiricist-driven slide into error-theory and relativism. They do so by encouraging a 
shift in initial focus from the putative objects of ethical thought and discourse to the 
subjects engaged in the practices that constitute such thought and discourse.1 Then, here, 
they suggest we find not description of the natural world but rather something like the 
expression of moral attitudes or the construction of solutions to practical problems. 
In this regard, Hume and Kant may each be read as already suggesting such accounts. 
Hume suggests that ethical thought and discourse is not mainly about putatively ethical 
matters of fact. (How could we ever have impressions of such things?) Instead he suggests 
ethics is mainly about bringing our sentiments into line with one another in pursuit of 
                                                
1 Compare Price (2004: 73) who makes a distinction between “object naturalism” and “subject naturalism”. 
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communal cooperation and fellow feeling. Kant also suggests that ethical thought and 
discourse is not mainly about putatively ethical matters of fact. (How could such things be 
subject to the causal laws governing the world of things as they appear to us?) Instead he 
suggests that ethics is about how to align our wills with the logical laws we give ourselves in 
reasoning practically. 
Each of these views offer an explanation of the apparently internal connection between 
ethics and action which turn on denying that ethical thought and discourse is best 
understood as describing some ordinary matter of fact. However, the explanations rest on 
markedly different understandings of the ‘internal’ connection. Followers of Hume are 
typically impressed by the apparently regular connection between one’s ethical judgments 
and one’s motivation to act in their stead. Roughly, if someone judges that she ought to φ, 
then ceteris paribus it’d be irregular if she weren’t at least somewhat motivated to φ. And 
because Humeans think that a motivation to act in one way rather than another must 
involve more than mere matter-of-factual beliefs, they suggest that ethical thought and 
discourse is more a matter of whatever else must be involved. In their view, that is 
something essentially desire-like, such as sentiments or attitudes. In contrast, followers of 
Kant are impressed by the apparently rational connection between ethical judgments and 
actions. Roughly, if someone judges that she ought to φ, then ceteris paribus it seems like she 
is practically irrational if she doesn’t φ. And because Kantians think that what one is 
rational to do always depends on more than the matter-of-factual beliefs that are within the 
scope of theoretical reasoning, they suggest that ethical thought and discourse must 
essentially involve the exercise of practical reasoning instead. 
In the contemporary metaethical debate, expressivist and constructivist views can be 
viewed as inspired by these ideas from Hume and Kant respectively.2 As I’ll use the labels, 
expressivism is the view that ethical discourse differs semantically from matter-of-factual 
thought and discourse in that ethical sentences mean what they do not in virtue of 
representing matters of fact but rather in virtue of conventionally expressing sentiments, 
attitudes, acceptances of norms, or (if you like) ethical ‘beliefs’ (as long as these are 
understood as essentially different from matter-of-factual beliefs). By contrast, constructivism 
holds that ethical thought and discourse differ from matter-of-factual thought and 
discourse in being not about putatively antecedently obtaining states of the world but 
rather about a special sort of facts which is ‘constructed’ out of the constraints of practical 
reasoning. Each of these views purports, in its own way, to respect the traditional 
motivation for irrealism in metaethics stemming from skepticism about ethical properties.  
To be sure, contemporary expressivists and contemporary constructivists will each 
acquiesce in talk of ethical properties ‘in a sense’, but they’ll deny that the sense in which 
they accept such talk puts these properties on a par with matter-of-factual properties, 
whose instantiation is empirically discoverable through the exercise of perception and 
theoretical reasoning. In this vein, contemporary expressivists sometimes say that there are 
ethical properties in a minimalist sense of ‘property’. This means, roughly, that there’s a 
pleonastic equivalence between, e.g., ‘φing is wrong’ and ‘φing has the property of being 
wrong’. And, similarly, contemporary constructivists sometimes say that there are ethical 
                                                
2 With expressivism, I have in mind the family of views represented by Ayer (1936/1946), Stevenson (1936), 
Blackburn (1993, 1998), Gibbard (1990, 2003), Timmons (1999), Ridge (2006, 2007). With constructivism, 
the view has been less well worked out in the metaethical literature, but it owes inspiration to Rawls (1980), 
and I mostly have in mind Korsgaard (2003), and Street (2008). There are realist versions of expressivism 
(Copp 2001) and constructivism (Lynch 2009: ch. 8). These views fall outside the scope of my interest in this 
paper. 
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properties in a constructed sense of ‘property’, which parallels the constructed sense in which 
there are ethical facts. This means, roughly, that ethical properties are not part of the 
fundamental nature of reality but constructed by practical reasoners.  
Whether minimalist or constructed properties, both sorts of irrealism agree that ethical 
properties are not the sort of thing that can be empirically discovered or known to be 
instantiated through the exercise of theoretical reasoning. And, as such, expressivists and 
constructivists don’t count them in the final ontological reckoning, even if there is some 
weaker sense in which they accept them. Moreover, each view picks up on either the 
Humean or the Kantian understandings of the apparently internal connection between 
ethics and action.  
Expressivism offers easy explanation of the apparently regular connection between 
one’s ethical judgments and one’s motivation to act in their stead. For, if those ethical 
judgments are thought to play a functional role more like desires than matter-of-factual 
beliefs, then they can provide what else must be added to one’s matter-of-factual beliefs to 
generate motivation to act. And, by viewing ethical claims as expressing desire-like states of 
some sort, expressivism avoids a realist picture according to which these claims are made 
correct or incorrect by empirically discoverable matters of fact.  
Constructivism offers easy explanation of the apparently rational connection between 
ethics and action. For, if ethical properties are not found in the world but constructed out 
of the constraints of the very sort of reasoning – practical reasoning – which determines 
which actions are rationally warranted, then appreciation of them can (at least sometimes) 
provide what more is needed for rationally warranted action, beyond the sorts of matter-of-
factual beliefs that are within the providence of theoretical reasoning. And, by viewing 
ethical properties not as discoverable or always already there in the world but as 
constructed out of the logical constraints on practical reasoning, the constructivist also 
claims consonance with naturalistic-driven skepticism about our empirical access to such 
properties.3 
A popular realist response to these contemporary irrealist views is to argue that they are 
inconsistent with obvious surface-level appearances of ordinary ethical thought and 
discourse. Casual reflection on ethical thought and discourse reveals very quickly that 
ordinary folk speak (and so appear to think) as if (i) some ethical claims are true and others 
are false, (ii) there are ethical facts, (iii) when we disagree about some ethical matter, it’s 
often because we have differing beliefs about what the ethical facts are, and (iv) in many 
easy cases, we know quite well what the ethical facts are. Although Hume and Kant, as well 
as early expressivists and constructivists may not have been too concerned to 
accommodate these appearances, doing so has come to be an important desideratum for 
anyone hoping to claim the mantel of irrealism in the contemporary debate.4 If one thinks 
that reality doesn’t include ethical properties in the final ontological reckoning, then one 
owes an account of (i)-(iv). Otherwise one’s irrealism will commit one to something like a 
radical error-theory or a pernicious relativism after all. 
                                                
3 Both expressivists and constructivists will often claim to be able to capture the other sense in which there 
appears to be an ‘internal’ connection between ethics and action. I don’t deny that this is possible; rather my 
point here is to sketch the central motivation for the differing views. 
4 This is mainly because of the pioneering work of Blackburn’s (1984: ch. 6, and 1993) development of the 
quasi-realist program, which seeks to recapture for irrealists the sorts of semantically infused talk (e.g. of 
truth, fact, property, etc.) that tempt many to realism in various areas. For more elucidation and further 
citations, see note 9 below. 
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My objective in the rest of this paper is to explore some constructivist and expressivist 
options for responding to this argument. My conclusion will be that, although both 
constructivists and expressivists can capture the first three features, the fourth (involving 
the possibility of ethical knowledge) causes special problems for these versions of irrealism. 
I’ll end with some comments about where I think irrealists should begin to look for a 
response to these special problems, which points somewhat surprisingly towards an 
alternative inferentialist form of irrealism. 
 
Constructivism 
Let’s begin with constructivism, because, at first blush, it seems the constructivist 
should have an easier time responding to the argument from appearances than the 
expressivist. For the constructivist holds very explicitly that there are ethical facts, it’s just 
that these facts are ‘constructed’ by the logical constraints on practical reasoning rather 
than found among the antecedently obtaining matters of fact. And, if there are ethical facts, 
then it’s no wonder that ordinary folk speak as if (i) some ethical claims are true and others 
are false, (ii) there are ethical facts, and (iii) when we disagree about some ethical matter, it’s 
often because we have differing beliefs about what the ethical facts are. But, when we begin 
to reflect on the fourth surface-level feature of ordinary ethical thought and discourse – 
viz., (iv) in many easy cases, we know quite well what the ethical facts are – this story 
begins to look a lot more tenuous than it may at first appear. Or, at least, so I will now 
argue. 
What do constructivists have to say about the nature and possibility of ethical 
knowledge? Clearly one thing they cannot say is that we have this knowledge just like we 
have knowledge of ordinary matters of fact. It’s part of the whole point of irrealism to deny 
that the ethical properties of things are discoverable through perception and theoretical 
reasoning like ordinary matters of fact. But what’s the alternative?  
Unfortunately, as it turns out, prominent constructivists have said very little. In her 
paper ‘Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth Century Moral Philosophy’, which has 
sparked much of the recent discussion of constructivism in metaethics, Korsgaard does 
briefly consider the issue of ethical knowledge. But she does so as a way of criticizing her 
realist competitors who, according to her, make the mistake of thinking of ethics as a 
pursuit of knowledge, which we can then apply in practice. She writes, ‘The moral realist 
thinks of practical philosophy as an essentially theoretical subject. Its business is to find, or 
anyway to argue that we can find, some sort of ethical knowledge that we can apply in 
action’(2003: 118; cp. also 1996: 44). But, besides thinking that this is wrongheaded, 
apparently Korsgaard thinks that the issue of ethical knowledge is almost entirely irrelevant. 
She continues: ‘According to constructivism, the only piece of knowledge that could be 
relevant here is knowledge that the problems represented by our normative terms are 
solvable, and the only way we can find out whether that is so is by trying to solve 
them’(ibid.). It takes a bit of unpacking to understand this curious claim. 
Korsgaard (ibid.: 104-105) suggests that it is crucial in seeking to understand the nature 
of ethical thought and discourse that we distinguish between three different questions one 
might ask about concepts and three correlative dichotomies in theoretical approach to 
understanding ethical concepts. First, there’s a question about the source of concepts. 
Rationalists about a concept say that it is derived from reason, and empiricists say that it is 
derived from experience. Then, there’s a question about the content of concepts. 
Cognitivists about a concept say that its content is constituted by the contribution it makes 
to propositions, and noncognitivists deny this, holding instead that the content is at least 
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partially constituted by something else such as the emotive or prescriptive force of its 
deployment. Finally, she thinks there’s a question about the function of concepts. 
Descriptivists about a concept say that its function is to describe things in the world, and 
constructivists say that its function is to name and think about a solution to a practical 
problem.  
In light of this, Korsgaard’s constructivist view of ethical concepts is one about their 
function rather than about their source or content: ‘They are the names of the solutions of 
problems, problems to which we give names to mark them out as objects for practical 
thought. The role of the concept of the right, say, is to guide action; the role of the concept 
of the good might be to guide our choice among options, or of ends’(2003: 116). And it is 
conceptions of the right or the good that are proposed as possible solutions. That is to say 
that these ethical concepts function to name whatever conception(s) solve the problems 
for which the concepts are needed. Thus, with Kant and Rawls in mind, Korsgaard writes, 
‘The task of practical philosophy is to move from concepts to conceptions, by constructing 
an account of the problem reflected in the concept that will point the way to a conception 
that solves the problem’(ibid.). 
I think it’s because she thinks that ethical concepts are the names of solutions to 
problems that she thinks that the only knowledge that could be relevant to the concerns of 
ethics is the knowledge that the problems we face are solvable. This is because the point of 
ethics as a discipline is not to acquire theoretical knowledge of some antecedently existing 
matter of fact but to generate solutions to practical problems in the form of conceptions of 
the good, the right, etc., which if successful will constitute constructions of the relevant 
ethical facts. 
Even if that is right, however, the metaethical realist may reasonably claim that 
Korsgaard has illicitly changed the subject.5 His concern is not primarily ethical but 
metaethical; and he demands an explanation of how constructivism squares with the 
ordinary practice of claiming and ascribing ethical knowledge. When someone says ‘I know 
that what I did was wrong’ or ‘We all know that one should help those most in need,’ 
surely it’s implausible to think that this knowledge is simply knowledge that a solution to 
the practical problem of what to do or not to do in certain circumstances is possible. Yes, 
we wouldn’t claim and ascribe such knowledge unless we thought (at least implicitly) that 
the practical problem was solvable, but these knowledge attributions seem to be more. 
They seem to be claims to know not only that there is a solution but also what the solution is. 
Perhaps, however, this line of objection is not maximally charitable Korsgaard. After 
all, she does hold that there are ethical facts, albeit constructed facts. So, maybe a more 
plausible response to the realist’s objection would come from a fuller idea of what’s 
involved in a fact’s being constructed and how we can then know such facts. I’m not 
entirely sure what metaethical constructivists mean my ‘constructed’, but Korsgaard gives 
us an example having to do with human artifacts such as chairs. She writes, ‘Why do we 
have the concept of chair? Certainly not because it would form part of the absolute 
conception of the world…We have the concept of “chair” because the physical 
construction of human beings makes it possible, and occasionally necessary, to sit 
down’(ibid.: 117). I take it the idea is that facts about chairs are constructed when humans 
think of and make, i.e. construct chairs, as a solution to our need to sit down. And it certainly 
seems like we can know many things about chairs. For example, we know that chairs 
generally have four legs. Thus, if ethical facts are constructed like facts about chairs are 
                                                
5 Compare FitzPatrick (2005) and Hussain and Shah (2006) where a similar point is made. 
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constructed, the ethical constructivist should have a complete answer to the realist 
argument from appearances. 
However, this line of thought is also problematic. If we’re thinking that facts about 
chairs are ‘constructed’ – and thus shouldn’t figure in the final ontological reckoning – 
because the concepts with which they are cognized would not figure in the ‘absolute 
conception of the world’, then surely that doesn’t mean that they are any less real than facts 
about things like rocks, which we are ‘found in nature’. This is because, Korsgaard may be 
right that the concept of chair won’t form part of the ‘absolute conception of the world’, 
but neither will the concept of rock. This is simply because both kinds of things can be 
conceived of in different and more objective ways. For example, if the conceptual scheme 
of physics approximates the absolute conception of the world better than the conceptual 
scheme of commonsense, which includes the concepts of ‘chair’ and ‘rock’, then what 
commonsense thinks of as chairs and rocks may also be thought of by physics as 
collections of physical particles arranged in particular ways.  
If, however, we’re thinking that facts about chairs are ‘constructed’ – and thus 
shouldn’t figure in the final ontological reckoning – because their existence qua chair, 
depends on a conceptual framework involving our practical need to sit down, this may 
explain their ontological difference from facts about rocks, but it doesn’t make for a useful 
model for ethical knowledge. For most of what we know about chairs (e.g. that they 
generally have four legs) we know through perception and theoretical reasoning (including 
induction). However, the point of the original irrealist argument stemming from Hume and 
Kant was precisely that we don’t seem to acquire ethical knowledge in this way. This means 
that the metaethical constructivist cannot appeal to the fact that we know a lot about 
constructed things like chairs to explain how we know about ethical facts, which she also 
conceives of as constructed. Indeed, it’s not even clear that we should think of these two 
kinds of fact as constructed in the same sense of ‘constructed’. 
So, before the constructivist can fully meet the realist argument from appearances, she 
needs a better account of the sense in which ethical facts are ostensibly constructed, which 
can then be used to develop a better account of ordinary attributions of ethical knowledge. 
Street (2008) points us in what may seem like a more fruitful direction with her discussion 
of the possibility of error in normative judgment. She writes, ‘While there are, ultimately, 
no normative truths that hold independently of our evaluative attitudes — while normative 
realism is false — it does not follow that it’s impossible to go wrong with one’s normative 
judgments’(ibid: 207). The reason she thinks this doesn’t follow is that her constructivist 
view has it that ‘the fact that X is a reason to Y for agent A is constituted by the fact that 
the judgment that X is a reason to Y (for A) withstands scrutiny from the standpoint of A’s 
other judgments about reasons’(ibid.: 223). And, given the (constructed) existence of such 
facts, it seems possible to know them to obtain. 
What would that involve? Street doesn’t say very much about the possibility of ethical 
knowledge, but she does have a worked out view of what it is for an ethical judgment to be 
true. According to her, truth in ethical judgment is constituted by the judgment’s ability to 
withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of other normative judgments. More specifically, 
because she wants to avoid the relativist conclusion that normative judgment is radically 
relative to each speaker’s point of view, she claims that the truth of such judgment depends 
on its ability to withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of the implicated agent. Moreover, 
the idea is not, I take it, that truth in ethical judgment comes only when the judgment 
stands up to actual scrutiny from the standpoint of other judgments of the implicated agent; 
rather, the idea is that truth comes when a judgment would withstand such scrutiny. And, if 
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that’s the right interpretation, Street’s constructivism comes to the view that ethical facts 
are constructed out of the ability that ethical judgments of them have to withstand scrutiny 
from the point of view of the implicated agent. This makes ethical facts ontologically 
dependent on human judgments/attitudes in a way that facts about chairs and rocks 
generally are not. Our judgments that chairs generally have four legs or that rocks are hard 
are not true in virtue of their ability to withstand scrutiny from other judgments – at least 
that’s a standard motif of realism. Street thinks the opposite is the case for ethical 
judgments, which means that she avoids one pitfall of Korsgaard’s view. 
If that’s right, we should be able to generate an account of ethical knowledge out of 
Street’s constructivist account of true ethical judgment. What’s needed is an account of 
what makes true ethical judgment (as Streed is conceiving of them) into knowledge. 
Epistemologists call this warrant. So what Street needs to make sense of ethical knowledge 
is an account of epistemic warrant for ethical judgments. 
 To this end, one thing she might try is to simply deploy one of the accounts of warrant 
already widely discussed in epistemology. Perhaps – to pick a representative instance of 
epistemic externalism and epistemic internalism – ethical knowledge requires true judgment 
formed by a reliable process or true judgment that is appropriately based on evidence. 
There is, however, a problem with this for Street. For, recall that she thinks the truth of 
ethical judgments consists in their ability to withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of the 
normative judgments of the implicated agent. That is, it’s an important feature of Street’s 
view that the relevant standpoint of scrutiny for a judgment like  
(1) Amy’s judgment that Bush ought not to have taken the country to war 
is the standpoint comprising the normative judgments of the implied agent, which in this case 
is Bush. This is how she avoids a radical form of speaker-relativism about the truth-
conditions for judgments like the one described in (1). However, if that’s right, then for (1) 
be warranted, it would seem that certain things would have to be true about the 
relationship between Amy and the standpoint comprising Bush’s normative judgments. For 
instance, on a reliabilist conception of warrant, in order to be knowledge, (1) would have to 
be formed by a process that reliably forms judgments that withstand scrutiny from Bush’s 
standpoint. But it’s implausible to think that all those who know that Bush ought not to 
have taken the country to war can reliably form judgments that withstand scrutiny from 
Bush’s perspective; Bush’s system of normative judgments may be entirely inscrutable to 
them. But, on an evidentialist conception of warrant, by contrast, in order to be knowledge, 
(1) would have to be appropriately based on evidence that it would withstand scrutiny from 
Bush’s standpoint. However, again, it’s implausible that all those who know that Bush 
ought not to have taken the country to war have based their judgment on evidence that it 
would withstand scrutiny from Bush’s standpoint, which may (to repeat) be rather 
inscrutable.  
The example of (1) and the reliabilist and evidentialist conceptions of warrant is just an 
example. However, I think it represents a real problem for Street’s brand of constructivism 
to capture ordinary talk of ethical knowledge. For even if she denies that example is a 
plausible example of ethical knowledge, it’s surely part of ordinary ethical thought and 
discourse to make ethical judgments which implicate agents whose system of normative 
judgments is inscrutable to us. Indeed, often we make generalized judgments about, e.g., 
what is right/wrong for everyone or what anyone ought to do in some situation, and it is 
implausible to think that we have judgment-forming processes that reliably track or that we 
base these judgments on evidence about what would withstand scrutiny from everyone’s or 
anyone’s system of normative judgments. 
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Now, admittedly, the reliabilist and evidentialist conceptions of epistemic warrant used 
in raising the objection just mooted are only two instances of possible accounts of 
epistemic warrant. However, it’s hard to see what alternative conception will avoid the 
problem I’ve raised. The only alternative that suggests itself (to me, at least) is to claim that 
ethical judgments are special in that, for them, warrant and truth come to the same thing. 
For Street’s brand of constructivism, that would mean that a judgment that someone ought 
to do something is both true and warranted in virtue of its ability to withstand scrutiny 
from the standpoint of the implicated agent’s normative judgments. This would save 
constructivism’s ability to accommodate ordinary talk of ethical knowledge. However, it 
seems to me to flounder on the problem of wrongly counting certain kinds of luckily true 
judgments as knowledge. 
Luckily true judgments don’t seem to be knowledge.6 The post-Gettier literature has 
taught us that even judgments that are warranted on a reliabilist or evidentailist conception 
of epistemic warrant could be true primarily because of luck and so not knowledge. But 
this would also be the case with a class of supposedly special judgments for which both 
truth and warrant amount to withstanding scrutiny from the standpoint of some other class 
of judgments. To appreciate this, consider again the example of (1). Now, however, 
contrast that with  
(2) Joe’s judgment that Bush ought to have taken the country to war,  
where both Amy and Joe don’t know very much about Bush’s system of normative 
judgments. Perhaps they have just guessed, or perhaps they have made their judgments by 
projecting their own general ethical views onto Bush. Now, assuming that there’s a fact of 
the matter about which of these judgments would withstand scrutiny from the perspective 
of Bush’s normative judgments, either Amy or Joe will have judged truly and the other 
falsely, according to Street’s constructivism. But, given her view of what constitutes the 
truth of ethical judgments, it seems that, whichever person has judged truly, he or she has 
done so primarily because of luck. So, unless we want to count ethical judgments that are 
true primarily because of luck as knowledge, it will do no good in attempting to 
accommodate the possibility of ethical knowledge for Street’s constructivist to say that 
truth and warrant come to the same thing in the special case of ethical knowledge. 
Perhaps Street could respond by arguing that we don’t have very much ethical 
knowledge after all. She doesn’t need to eliminate all ethical knowledge. In cases, e.g., 
where the implicated agent is the person making the judgment, it may be easier to have 
warranted beliefs about what would or would not withstand scrutiny from the standpoint 
of the agent’s other normative judgments. However, in third-personal cases, Street could 
claim that it will be more difficult to have warranted ethical judgments, and ethical 
knowledge will simply be much harder to come by.  
I think this would represent a coherent irrealist stance on the possibility of ethical 
knowledge. But it wouldn’t answer the realist’s argument from surface-level appearances 
that I am considering in this paper. For recall that the realist’s argument emerges in a 
debate between realists and irrealists who want to avoid some radical error-theory or 
pernicious relativism in our metaethics. Originally, constructivism seemed to offer some 
promise of such irrealism, since constructivists recognize that there are, in a sense, ethical 
                                                
6 This claim requires some qualification. For some kinds of luck are compatible with knowledge. For 
example, knowledge that a pelican just flew by the car may depend on being lucky enough to have looked out 
the window at the opportune moment. However, other kinds of luck are not compatible. I’m discussing those 
other kinds of luck here (without attempting to specify them precisely). See Pritchard (2005: ch. 5-6) for 
discussion of permissible and impermissible forms of epistemic luck. 
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truths, facts, and disagreements in belief. This helps them to accommodate ordinary talk of 
such things. However, what I think we should conclude from the preceding discussion is 
that metaethical constructivists like Korsgaard and Street have not yet7 offered us a sense in 
which there can be ethical knowledge on their view; and until they do so, they won’t have 
answered the realist’s argument from appearances. 
 
Expressivism 
Recall that the argument we are considering against irrealist views like constructivism 
and expressivism is that they cannot capture the surface-level appearances of ordinary 
ethical thought and discourse; this includes ordinary folk’s propensity to speak as if there 
are ethical truths, facts, disagreements in belief, and knowledge. It may seem that 
expressivists have no chance of deflecting this argument, since, inspired by Hume, they 
think that ethical thought and discourse does not mainly involve beliefs in matters of fact 
but rather coordinating our sentiments in order to live well in community. Indeed that view 
is supposed to found an alternative semantics for ethical discourse, according to which 
ethical sentences get their meaning not from what they (purport) to represent but from the 
desire-like mental states they (conventionally) express. Recently, however, expressivists 
have been resourceful in accommodating the appearances of ordinary ethical thought and 
discourse. They typically do so by interpreting the surface-level features of ordinary ethical 
thought and discourse in a way that is neutral between realism and irrealism, thus insisting 
that the appearances do not sway the debate one way or another. 
For example, when it comes to truth, expressivists now typically embrace some general 
account of truth that is neutral on the ontology of morality – such as deflationism or 
minimalism.8 Then they claim that adopting such a theory of truth allows us to say that 
there is no more ontological commitment involved in saying, e.g., that it’s true that torture 
is wrong than in saying that torture is wrong. To be sure, that doesn’t entail that there’s no 
ontological commitment involved. But what it does mean is that the mere fact that 
ordinary folk think and talk as if moral claims are true is no threat to the expressivist. We 
might call this an ‘accommodation story’ for ordinary talk of ethical truths.9 With it, the 
expressivist can accommodate this feature of ordinary ethical thought and discourse. 
The accommodation story for ordinary talk of ethical facts and ethical beliefs is very 
similar and intimately related. In ordinary ethical thought and discourse, it seems that the 
notion of ‘fact’ can be replaced without much loss by talking about truth. ‘It’s a fact that 
torture is wrong’ seems not to be appreciably different in ordinary discourse from ‘It’s true 
that torture is wrong’. So, as long as the accommodation story for truth is cogent, then it 
will extend easily to facts. Likewise, ‘She believes that torture is wrong’ isn’t appreciably 
different in ordinary discourse from ‘She thinks it’s true that torture is wrong’. So, again, if 
the accommodation story for truth works, then there shouldn’t be a problem for the 
expressivist to recognize a category of ethical beliefs, even though he denies that these 
                                                
7 There’s a promising footnote in Street’s paper where she hints at a constructivist metaepistemology, but she 
doesn’t develop the view there. It’s something like this which I think a constructivist will need to overcome 
the realist argument from appearances. 
8 For example, one of the views defended by Quine (1970), Field (1986, 1994), Horwich (1990), or Wright 
(1992). 
9 This strategy received its first explicit expression when Blackburn proposed the ‘enterprise of quasi-realism,’ 
which ‘tries to earn, on the slender basis [of expressivist anti-realism], the features of moral language…which 
might tempt people to realism’(1984: 171). It has been subsequently developed by inter alia Blackburn (1992), 
Stoljar (1993), Horgan and Timmons (1993, 2000), Timmons (1999), and Gibbard (2003).  
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beliefs are matter-of-factual beliefs, since they have a different psycho-functional role and 
direction of fit with the world.10 And the expressivist will construe ostensible disagreement 
in ethical beliefs as a different sort of disagreement from disagreement over ordinary 
matters of fact. Philosophers may want to make fine distinctions between how they use 
notions like truth and fact, or belief and thinking true, but ordinary thought and discourse 
seems to run these notions together fluidly. And this means that no mere appeal to 
ordinary talk of ethical truth, fact, or belief will undermine expressivism – at least not if the 
expressivist is allowed his favored interpretation of these terms. 
This last ‘if’ is a big one, of course, but assuming we accept it, I think it puts the 
expressivist very quickly on a par with the constructivist with respect to the realist 
argument from appearances. If we reject representationalist assumptions behind realism, it 
turns out to be relatively easy to tell a constructivist or expressivist story that makes sense 
of the way ordinary ethical thought and discourse deploys the notions of truth, fact, and 
belief. As with constructivism before, however, I think the notion of knowledge poses a 
special problem for the expressivist. This is because knowledge seems to require not only 
true judgment but also some sort of warrant for this judgment. And, as we saw above, 
warrant seems like it must involve some element that avoids the possibility of luckily true 
judgment. However, as irrealists, expressivists cannot make the appeal epistemologists 
typically make to the idea of reliably tracking the properties of things in the world. For, 
although they can talk with the ordinary folk and speak of the fact that, e.g., torture is 
wrong, they don’t want to understand this talk in a way which involves treating our 
knowledge of it as empirically tracking some property of wrongness, which figures in the 
final ontological reckoning. That means that the expressivist owes an alternative account of 
the role of the notion of knowledge in ordinary ethical thought and discourse. 
Fortunately, expressivists have said significantly more about the ordinary talk of ethical 
knowledge than their constructivist compatriots. In pursuit of an accommodation story 
here, they seek to embrace some general account of knowledge that is neutral on the 
metaethical debate. For instance, Blackburn suggests that, '…the primary function of 
talking of "knowledge" is to indicate that a judgment is beyond revision. That is, we rule 
out any chance that an improvement might occur, that would properly lead to a revision of 
the judgment'(1998: 318). And Gibbard claims that knowledge attributions, such as 'Joe 
knows there are cows on the hill…means very roughly…that judgments like his are to be 
relied on. '(2003: 227).  
This maneuver handles the problem with luckily true ethical judgments, which seemed 
to trip up constructivists like Street. On Blackburn’s version of the idea, he can say that our 
intuition that such judgments are not knowledge is just a reflection of our view that an 
improvement might occur, i.e. that the luckiness might be revealed, which would properly 
lead to revision. And on Gibbard’s version of the idea, he can say that these intuitions are a 
reflection of our view judgments that are formed in a way that is subject to luck are not 
one’s that are to be relied on. 
However, this maneuver does raise an important question: What is going on when we 
indicate that a judgment is ‘beyond revision’ or ‘to be relied on’? Are we stating a matter of 
fact or are we expressing some desire-like state? I take it both Blackburn and Gibbard 
mean the latter. That is, Blackburn’s idea is that, when we move from the fact that 
                                                
10 Perhaps ordinary speakers are committed to the in principle resolvability of disagreements in ethical 
belief.(Smith 1994: 5-6) However, I doubt this is true. It’s a different issue whether expressivism is consistent 
with a defensible theory of ethical disagreement. On this, Egan (2007) poses a serious challenge to 
expressivism which is outside the scope of the present paper. 
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someone judges that p to claiming that he knows that p, we are expressing an epistemic 
stance towards this person's judgment. We are marking it out as 'beyond revision' in the 
sense that 'no further useful investigation or thought ought to undermine the 
[judgment]'(1996: 87). Gibbard is even clearer about embracing epistemic expressivism. His 
technical terms for judgments that require an expressivistic analysis is ‘plans’ and ‘plan-
laden’, and he writes, ‘…attributions of knowledge are plan-laden…Concluding that Joe 
knows, then, amounts to planning to rely on his judgment’(Ibid.).  
However, we might worry that someone’s judgment could be thought to ‘beyond 
revision’ in Blackburn’s sense or ‘to be relied on’ in Gibbard’s sense but nonetheless false; 
and surely false judgments do not count as knowledge. Perhaps Blackburn and Gibbard 
could avoid this problem with a fuller account of what sorts of judgments are ‘beyond 
revision’ or ‘to be relied on’, but a simple way to avoid the problem is to supplement 
Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s accounts of ‘knows’ with a truth condition. The idea would be 
that when we ascribe knowledge, we are not only expressing an epistemic stance towards 
someone’s judgment that p, we’re also endorsing p as true.11  
In sum, the expressivist response to the problem of accommodating ordinary talk of 
ethical knowledge is to extend the scope of the expressivist theory to include epistemic 
judgments like knowledge attributions alongside ethical judgments. The most plausible 
version of expressivism for knowledge attributions is a form of what is sometimes called 
‘hybrid’ expressivism, because it holds that knowledge attributions have some matter-of-
factual content (i.e. that the subject has a judgment which we regard as true) but they also 
have some extra content that is explicable in only in terms of the expression of a desire-like 
state that might be characterized as ‘indicating that the judgment is beyond revision’ or 
‘planning to rely on the judgment’.  
The attraction of this position for the expressivist about ethical judgments is parallel to 
the attraction of a minimalist or deflationist account of truth. It allows the expressivist to 
interpret ordinary talk of ethical knowledge in a way that is neutral on the metaethical 
debate. If we don’t, in general, understand knowledge attributions in terms of the putative 
knower reliably tracking some empirically discoverable matter-of-factual properties, then 
there is theoretical space to hold that ethical judgments can be coherently called 
knowledge, even though they don’t involve such tracking of the external world. We’ll call 
them knowledge when we think they are true and meet the epistemic norms we accept. As 
Gibbard puts the point, ‘…knowledge of what to do…goes beyond just happening to track 
the right property in our planning…we fasten onto the right things to live for because we 
are in a condition to be trusted on such matters – or so we judge’(2003: 235). 
This accommodation story overcomes some of the problems for constructivism 
stemming from the realist’s argument from appearances, and it does so in a way that seems 
to me to be consistent with ethical irrealism and the advantages for explaining the internal 
connection between ethical matters and action (at least on the Humean interpretation of 
this connection). However, extending expressivism to cover knowledge attributions as well 
as ethical claims highlights two problems that have led me, anyway, to look for other 
options. 
The first problem doesn’t really have anything to do with epistemic expressivism per se, 
but I think extending the expressivist’s semantic view from ethical sentences to epistemic 
sentences may highlight for some the way in which expressivism involves a highly 
controversial semantic view. Unlike constructivists and realists, who can endorse a standard 
                                                
11 This is the basic strategy I pursued in my own previous defense of epistemic expressivism; see my (2007). 
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account of the meaning of ethical sentences in terms of their truth-conditions (even while 
they disagree about what constitutes these truth-conditions), expressivists found their 
irrealism on an alternative semantic account of ethical sentences, which now looks like it 
has to be extended to epistemic sentence, in order to answer the realist argument from 
appearances. The expressivist holds, roughly, that these sentences mean what they do not 
in virtue of their truth-conditions but in virtue of the desire-like state that they express. 
Given the apparent discontinuities in function and practical import between ethical 
language and paradigmatically descriptive language, attempting to work this view into a 
viable semantics may seem like a worthwhile project. However, it involves theoretical costs 
associated both with attempting to give a non-circular ‘ideationalist’ or ‘psychologistic’ 
account of semantic content12 and with capturing the logical continuities between 
expressivistic language and matter-of-factual language.13 Thus, when the expressivist is 
required to extend that project to epistemic sentences as well, one may begin to wonder 
whether the theoretical costs it incurs don’t outweigh whatever advantages it purports to 
bring. Another way to put the point is that if the expressivist semantics for ethical 
sentences requires an expressivist semantics for epistemic sentences, then Frege-Geach 
type worries are even more pressing than they already seemed in the ethical case. 
Expressivists can legitimately ignore this first problem, since they are already 
committed to there being an answer to any objections generated by their alternative 
semantics for ethical and epistemic sentences. However, the second problem I see 
challenges the overall cogency of the expressivist position, once epistemic expressivism is 
added to ethical expressivism in an attempt to accommodate appearances.  
To appreciate this problem, recall that part of the original motivation for irrealism in 
metaethics is the apparently special link between ethics and action, though, as we saw 
above, Humeans and Kantians have different accounts about the nature of this link. 
Roughly, Humeans think that it is a matter of a regular connection between ethical 
judgments and being suitably motivated. In contrast, Kantians think that the link is a 
matter of a rational link between ethical judgments and acting in certain ways. Expressivists 
follow Hume on this, which is why they claim that ethical judgments mainly function to 
help us to coordinate sentiments in pursuit of communal cooperation and fellow feeling. 
Thus, a large part of the motivation for expressivism in metaethics is a commitment to the 
Humean account of the special internal connection between ethics and the will combined 
with the claim that expressivism best explains/captures this connection. 
However, I think it generates a dilemma if expressivists now want to extend their 
expressivism to cover epistemic judgments as well as ethical judgments. The dilemma is 
that either a parallel argument from the Humean interpretation of internalism is also a 
powerful motivation for expressivism about epistemic judgments or this sort of argument 
is not a very powerful motivation for expressivism about ethical judgments in the first 
place.  
The problem along the first horn is that we don’t have the same sorts of internalist 
intuitions when it comes to epistemic judgments such as knowledge attributions as we do 
                                                
12 The sort suggested by Grice (1957), and worked out in different ways by Schiffer (1972) and Davis (2003). 
13 No participant to the metaethical debate denies that it is highly debatable whether expressivism about 
ethical claims can provide a semantics for ethical sentences that is even structurally adequate for the task of 
distinguishing the semantic values of ethical claims under simple logical operations and propositional attitude 
reports. Recently Schroeder (2008), picking up some strands from inter alia Unwin (1999) and Dreier (2006), 
has persuasively argued that most extant versions of expressivism have inadequate explanations of the 
semantic function of negation and propositional attitude reports. 
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with ethical judgments. With ethical judgments, the internalist intuition (interpreted 
Hume’s way) was that, if someone judges, e.g., that she ought to give to charity, then ceteris 
paribus it’d be strange if she weren’t at least somewhat motivated to give to charity. As we 
said, the motivation seems to attach regularly to the ethical judgment. That’s pretty much 
accepted as an intuitive datum in the metaethical attempt to explain ethical judgments. But 
there doesn’t seem to be a parallel for epistemic judgments. If someone judges, for 
example, that he knows that the moon is about a quarter of a million miles from the earth, 
then what do we expect him to be motivated to do? It’s not clear that there is anything in 
particular.  
An expressivist might suggest that this person will be motivated to believe that the 
moon is about a quarter of a million miles away from the earth. But that’s an odd thing to 
say for two reasons: First, unlike the previous example of giving to charity, which is yet to 
be done, when one judges that he knows that the moon is about a quarter of a million 
miles from the earth, one typically already believes this to be true. Second, believing isn’t 
(usually) the sort of thing that can be the object of our motivations, since believing is 
(usually) involuntary.14 Alternatively, an expressivist might suggest that someone who 
judges himself to have such knowledge will be motivated to testify that the moon is about a 
quarter of a million miles from the earth, if asked. But, even if that is indeed true, it’s not 
clear that the epistemic judgment is what bears the internal connection to this motivation; 
after all, one who firmly believes that the moon is about a quarter of a million miles away 
(but has never considered whether he knows this to be true) would be similarly motivated 
to testify.  
Something else an expressivist might try is to suggest that someone who judges himself 
to know that p will be motivated to act as if p is true. However, that’s such a weak 
requirement, that I think it will prove almost impossible to form any plausible intuition 
about whether there is a regular connection between self-attributions of knowledge and 
such motivation. For example, if I wanted to test whether our knower is indeed motivated 
to act as if the moon is about a quarter of a million miles from the earth, how would I go 
about doing so? What is it to act as if the moon is about a quarter of a million miles from 
the earth? How would I distinguish this ostensible motivation from other very similar 
possible motivations, such as acting as if the moon is about 380,000 kilometers from the 
earth? I don’t think these questions are easy for the epistemic expressivist to answer in a 
plausible way. The trouble here is not that there aren’t some motivations that might attach 
somewhat regularly to self-attributions of knowledge, but that there are enough other 
things that could explain these motivations that the internalist intuition in the epistemic 
case must be much weaker than in the ethical case. 
Even if there is no regular connection between first-personal self-attributions of 
knowledge and being motivated to act in certain ways that could serve in a parallel 
argument from internalism to expressivism, the expressivist could try to find the regular 
link between knowledge attributions and the will in third-personal attributions of 
knowledge to others. For example, Gibbard’s suggestion seems to be that claiming that 
someone knows that p amounts to planning to rely on him with respect to p. So, maybe 
the internal connection is to being motivated to rely on someone’s judgment. However, 
that can’t be right given the truth requirement on knowledge. Because of this, one wouldn’t 
ascribe knowledge that p to someone S unless one already took p to be true. This suggests 
that the elusive internal connection might be found between claims of the form ‘S knows 
                                                
14 For more on involuntarism and why it’s nevertheless compatible with normative epistemic claims, see my 
(2008a). 
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whether p’ and being motivated to rely on with respect to p. However, that too fails to be 
plausible. I may be able to tell you which of my students know whether Ayer was an 
expressivist or a subjectivist, but that doesn’t mean that I’d be motivated to rely on their 
judgments on this matter – to put this somewhat arrogantly: I don’t need to rely on their 
judgments. 
There may yet be some internal connection between some epistemic judgment and 
motivation to action, but, even if there is, its presence surely isn’t an intuitive datum of the 
metaepistemological debate like the presence of the connection in the ethical case is. Thus, 
if my dilemma is correct, then the expressivist will be forced onto the second horn, which 
involved conceding the weakness of the argument from internalism to expressivism. 
Although being forced onto this horn of the dilemma surely wouldn’t be the end of 
expressivism – there may, after all, be other arguments for the view beside the argument 
from internalism – I think it clearly represents a significant theoretical cost for the 
expressivist.  
So, although I think expressivists are on a par with constructivists with respect to 
accommodating the ordinary use of notions of ethical truth, fact, and belief, the 
accommodation story they give about ordinary talk of ethical knowledge raises separate 
problems for the theory. And these problems will remain fodder for the realist’s argument 
from surface-level appearances. 
 
Conclusion 
I’ve been exploring constructivist and expressivist responses to the realist argument 
from the surface-level appearances of ordinary ethical thought and discourse. I’ve argued 
that the feature of those appearances that causes the most trouble for constructivists and 
expressivists is the way ordinary folk talk of ethical knowledge. In a way, this shouldn’t be 
surprising, since part of the original motivation for irrealism was skepticism about empirical 
access to the ethical properties of things. Does this mean that irrealism is destined to be 
undermined by the realist argument from appearances? I’m not sure, but I think the 
discussion of constructivism and expressivism may point the way to an alternative response 
to the argument than the ones we’ve already seen. I’ll conclude with some speculative 
comments about how that might go. 
The expressivist’s basic maneuver for capturing ordinary talk about ethical knowledge 
is to extend his form of irrealism to apply to epistemic thought and discourse just like it 
applies to ethical thought and discourse. However, one of the main motivations for 
expressivism in the ethical case – the argument from Humean internalism – seems like it 
doesn’t carry over to the epistemic case. This problem threatens epistemic expressivism, 
but it doesn’t necessarily threaten epistemic irrealism. For, of course, there are other 
irrealist options. One of these would be to develop a constructivist form of epistemic 
irrealism. Perhaps this could pick up on the Kantian interpretation of internalism rather 
than the Humean interpretation. Street hints that this is the direction she’d be inclined to 
go, writing in a footnote: ‘While I believe that constructivism also provides the best 
account of the normativity of epistemic reasons, I will not discuss that here’(2008: 209). It 
will be key in working out this idea to explain the way epistemic reasons for matter-of-
factual beliefs differ from epistemic reasons for ethical beliefs, while retaining the idea that 
neither sort of belief can count as knowledge if it is merely luckily true. 
However, I think another option lies in the inferentialist idea articulated by Sellars in 
his slogan that, ‘…in characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not 
giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space 
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of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says’(1956). Fleshing out the full 
implications of this idea is beyond the scope of the present paper, but three parting 
comments are in order.15  
First, I take Sellars idea of ‘placing an episode or state in the logical space of reasons’ to 
be both interestingly similar to and importantly different from Blackburn’s idea of 
‘indicating that a judgment is beyond revision’ and Gibbard’s idea of ‘planning to rely on 
someone’s judgment’. These ideas align in the naturalist-inspired focus on the subject of 
epistemic thought and discourse rather than its putative object. That is Sellars would agree 
with Blackburn and Gibbard that epistemic notions allow us to take up a distinctive 
epistemic stance. This is, I take it, why Sellars denies that characterizations of an episode or 
state as one of knowing are ‘empirical descriptions’.  
However, the sort of view of epistemic claims which results from Blackburn and 
Gibbard’s ideas would, insofar as it parallels their view of ethical claims, be one where the 
relevant epistemic stance is psychologically articulated. That is, it’s explained in terms of its 
causal-functional role in the psychology of the person who manifests it. It’s here that 
expressivists seek to draw an interesting disanalogy between the target area of thought and 
discourse (epistemic or ethical) and matter-of-factual thought and discourse. This is why 
they speak of this state as ultimately more desire-like than belief-like. And expressivism 
holds that the meaning of epistemic claims is determined in part by their role as 
expressions of that state.  
In contrast, someone following out Sellars idea would seek to articulate the state in 
terms of its inferential role, which in turn would be explained in terms of the inferential 
potential of the relevant concepts in the community of concept-users who have epistemic 
concepts. It is here that he would seek to draw an interesting disanalogy between epistemic 
thought and discourse and matter-of-factual thought and discourse. The idea, roughly, 
would be to argue that the former is essentially caught up in governing the practice of 
giving and asking for reasons, while the latter is essentially caught up only in theoretical 
inferences towards doxastic states like belief. And this view is naturally allied with an 
inferentialist semantics rather than an expressivist semantics, since it will hold that the 
meaning of epistemic claims is determined by their socially articulated inferential role rather 
than their psychologically articulated expressive role.16 Or, another way to put this contrast 
is in terms of the different things expressivists and inferentialists think epistemic terms 
make it possible for us to do. Expressivists think that the ability made possible by 
epistemic claims is at its core an ability to express a certain kind of attitude. Inferentialists, 
by contrast, think the ability made possible by epistemic claims is at its core an ability to 
have that very attitude with its attendant inferential role.17 
My second parting comment is that I think the inferentialist view of epistemic 
judgments suggested by Sellars provides a nice way to accommodate ordinary folk’s talk of 
ethical knowledge within an irrealist framework. The key will be the claim that ethical 
judgments can be ‘placed in the space of reasons’ just as much as any other sort of 
judgment. And here both irrealists and realists alike should agree that ethical judgments are 
ones which we can sometimes justify, even if they disagree about whether that justification 
                                                
15 See my (ms) for an attempt at an account of propositional knowledge which is inspired by Sellars’ slogan 
and aims to meet a number of desiderata stemming from current debates in epistemology. See my 
(forthcoming) for some more discussion of the relationship between epistemic expressivism and epistemic 
inferentialism. 
16 The sort of semantic program developed by Rosenberg (1974) and Brandom (1994). 
17 Compare Craig (1990), Williams (1992), and Rosenberg (2002: ch. 5-6) 
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involves empirically tracking some external moral properties which figure in the final 
ontological reckoning. So, Sellars’ inferentialism about knowledge attributions seems to 
provide a neutral way to accommodate the final feature of ordinary ethical discourse that 
figures in the realist’s argument from surface-level appearances. This means that, if I’m 
right that the notion of ethical knowledge poses a special problem for irrealists like 
constructivists and expressivists, then Sellars’ inferentialist and irrealist view of knowledge 
attributions should seem like an attractive way to solve the problem.18 
Third, now that we’ve seen the beginnings of an irrealist account of epistemic 
judgments that is neither a form of epistemic constructivism nor a form of epistemic 
expressivism, but rather a form of inferentialism, I think we should ask whether a similar 
account of ethical judgments might not provide an attractive alternative form of ethical 
irrealism. That is, might it not make sense to say that in characterizing an action as one that 
someone ethically should or shouldn’t do, we are not (to modify the metaphor from 
Sellars) giving an empirical description of that action, rather we are placing it in the space 
of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one does? If we can inferentially 
articulate an interesting disanalogy between ethical concepts and the empirical concepts 
involved in matter-of-factual judgments, we’d have a third irrealist alternative to place 
beside constructivism and expressivism in the menu of general metaethical theories. The 
core similarity with these views would be the idea that what we’re doing in making ethical 
judgments is not to describe empirically discoverable matters of fact. The core difference 
from these views would be the specific view about what ethical terms make possible for us 
to do; the idea is not that they make it possible for us to construct practical facts or to express 
desire-like attitudes with a distinctive pressure on motivation but to articulate the difference 
between good and bad practical inferences.19 
Moreover, although I haven’t argued for this claim here, it seems to me that this 
alternative would better meet the realist argument from appearances. This is mostly 
because it can accommodate ordinary talk of ethical truth, fact, and belief along similar 
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